Iverson's Brigade Brig. Gen. A. Iverson  
5th.  North Carolina Regiment  
12th.North Carolina Regiment  
20th.North Carolina Regiment  
23rd.North Carolina Regiment**

 
 

 
13th.North Carolina Regiment
Left back Rich. Va. Home guard

 

 

Jackson J. Mays            23rd. North Carolina Regiment  A Company

My Great Great Grandfather Wife Mahala Pope Mays

Enlisted: Statesville N.C. Sept.6, 1861 By:Capt. McRae
Remarks: Jackson Mays Dec. of 1862 was treated for a piece of shell hit him in the forearm
Remarks: Jackson Mays in May of 1863 was in line of battle when shell
               went off and knocked him down and broke his arm.
Remarks: Jackson Mays was captured around May 12, 1864 Spotsylvania Va.
Remarks: Jackson Mays Prisoner of war, Elmira N.Y. Aug. 14,1864
 

Civil War Veteran

Honored J. Mays
 
     

 

 

  
     
 

Find The 23rd.North Carolina Chick on Links Belowe
23rd  North Carolina 1 23rd.North Carolina 2 23rd.North Carolina 3 23rd.North Carolina 4 23rd.North Carolina 5
23rd.North Carolina 6 23rd.North Carolina 7 23rd.North Carolina 8 23rd.North Carolina 9 23rd.North Carolina10
 
 
 

GETTYSBURG JULY 1, 1863

                                                 The Fight on Oak Hill

 

Iverson begin to move. To his astonishment, he learned that O'Neal was already moving, so he began his own advance at once.!

For some reason, Iverson chose not to advance with his troops, but stayed behind near their jump off point. !His absence from the front line meant the brigade had no guiding hand to direct it. Rodes had perhaps intended the unit to attack straight down the Mummasburg Road into the center of Baxter's line. Instead, it drifted to the right. The reason for this is not understood today. Perhaps Iverson's regimental commanders did not see Baxter's line, and headed towards Cutler's men in the far woods, to their right, whom they could see. Another interpretation according to some sources is that Iverson directed his regiments to head towards the gap between Baxter's and Cutler's commands. Iverson's men may also have been concerned about the lack of support on their left, where O'Neal's troops had been so quickly turned back.

Iverson's brigade was formed on a 600 yard wide line astride the Mummasburg Road with its regiments in the following order from left to right: 5th, 20th, 23rd and 12th North Carolina. Just before the brigade advanced, General Rodes rode up to the 12th North Carolina on the right of the brigade and encouraged its men, "Boys, they are advancing on us; go ahead and meet them." This anecdote confirms Rodes' preoccupation with the heavy skirmishers of the 97th New York and fellow Union regiments in the Forney field. It may well be true that he mistook the realigning of Baxter's regiments as a preparation to advance on his division (and T. H. Carter's two batteries), as Walter Montgomery of the 12th North Carolina has suggested. Iverson's advance began sometime between 1400 and 1430, probably closer to the later terminus. Its line of advance was through the open fields of the Forney farm with "not a bush nor a tree between the place where Iverson formed and the Federal line, a distance of nearly half a mile." The field was all open meadow, covered with timothy. It was traversed by a wooden east-west fence (no longer extant) some 700 feet south of the Mummasburg Road and by a second east-west fence (which survives) another 500 feet further south. Iverson's "bounded forward" at the beginning of the attack, and then "advanced under artillery fire through the grass in gallant style, as evenly as if on parade." General Iverson exhorted them forward with the cry to "give them hell," but did not accompany the brigade's advance, and instead stayed in the rear. Some other troops in the division thought he stayed behind because he was a drunk, a coward in hiding, or both. The historian of the 12th North Carolina blames Iverson's absence for the fact that the brigade made a partial wheel once it passed the Forney house and so "was put in a false alignment, in a northeast and southwest line." It appears from Iverson's battle report, however, that he simply chose to lead his brigade from the rear. He was aware of the brigade's line of advance, and may have ordered the partial wheel himself. If his men proceeded directly south from their original position on Oak Hill, they would have struck Cutler's brigade and left their eastern flank exposed to the troops who engaged O'Neal; a shift of some sort was necessary in order to move to a southwesterly line of advance and strike the Union troops on northern Seminary Ridge above Cutler's position. From his position in the rear of his command, Iverson was aware of the gap on his left, but from what he had been told by Rodes, he "presumed that it would soon be filled by the advancing Alabama brigade, under Colonel O'Neal." He also met personally with Daniel to request "immediate support, as I was attacking a strong position." Daniel promised to send a strong regiment, which satisfied O'Neal. Iverson then requested Daniel to take care of "a large force of the enemy who were about to outflank my right," and Daniel began moving off in that direction.

Iverson's gravest error was not in staying behind his troops during their attack, but in failing to reconnoiter their line of advance before the attack began. His regiments apparently proceeded in perfect parade ground order, with no skirmishers in their front. Had any skirmishers been sent out, they surely would have encountered Baxter's line just beyond the crest of Oak Ridge on Iverson's left. If Iverson's men did not see Baxter's line, Baxter's men surely saw Iverson's line approaching. General Robinson arrived on northern Seminary Ridge just as Iverson was beginning his advance, and became concerned about the gap between Baxter's left and Cutler's line. For this reason, he directed Baxter "to change front forward on his left battalion, and to close this interval, toward which the enemy was making his way."Baxter complied by shifting his left two regiments, the 11th.Pennsylvania and 97th New York, to their left so as to connect with Cutler's line. They formed behind a rock fence that ran near the crest of the ridge to the west, but it was the ridge crest, not the fence, that offered real shelter to the new line. Isaac Hall of the 97th New York later wrote that he had to step forward up slope "and stretch my neck" in order to get a view of Iverson's advance." The regiment's line at this time was some 16 yards east of the site of its monument. Since the leftward shift of the 11.th Pennsylvania and 97th New York left a gap between the right of the 97th and the 12th Massachusetts line at the Mummasburg Road, Baxter pulled the 83rd New York and 88th Pennsylvania from his right in order to fill the void. These units were available to face Iverson because O'Neal was not at the moment posing a threat from the north. Captain Edmund Patterson of the 88th Pennsylvania reported that his regiment "changed our position by the left flank, file left, which brought us up a slight hill." This movement brought the regiment to the top of the hill, where it formed behind a stone wall nearly perpendicular to the road. John Vautier of the 88th Pennsylvania wrote that he was able to see Iverson's advance while kneeling behind the stone fence; thus the fence was closer to the west of the hill at this point than it was farther to the left, where the 97th New York was posted. . While the left of the brigade was being realigned, the 12th Massachusetts shifted its line to the left to face Iverson. It formed along the same rock fence occupied by the rest of the brigade to the left, except here the fence was offset to the west some 20 yards. The movement of the 12th Massachusetts permitted the 90th Pennsylvania, which now formed the right of the brigade line, to slide to its left. The left wing of the 90th formed facing westward, while its right wing formed along the Mummasburg Road, facing north. During this movement the 90th Pennsylvania found itself exposed to a heavy fire from O'Neal's skirmishers to the north, and the 12th Massachusetts encountered fire from another advancing enemy line, perhaps the 3rd Alabama. Robinson could not afford to leave his right unsupported, so he called forward Paul's brigade from its reserve position in front of the Seminary. Doubleday was able to spare Paul's men because there was not at the moment any other Confederate pressure along his line. Doubleday directed Robinson to accompany Paul's advance in person. Paul's command, however, would not arrive in time to meet the height of Iverson's attack. Baxter's men reformed their line facing Iverson very carefully so they would not be seen by the enemy. As already noted, the left part of the line was hidden from Iverson's view by the crest of the ridge, while the right portion lay behind a stone wall. V. E. Turner of the 12th North Carolina remarked that Iverson's men were "not knowing certainly where the enemy was, for his whole line, with every flag, was concealed behind the rock wall on their right and the drop in the ground on their left. Not one of them was to be seen." Baxter also apparently kept his position concealed by not sending out skirmishers; none are mentioned in the accounts of this portion of the engagement by either Union or Confederate sources. Besides, there was no need for skirmishers, since the line of lverson's advance was in plain view across the Forney field. The Confederates advanced in perfect alignment, with their colors to the front. The veteran troops of Baxter's brigade held their fire and "quietly awaited their command to open." Word was quietly spread to aim low when the time came. John Vautier of the 88th Pennsylvania commented that: "lverson's men, with arms at a right shoulder, came on in splendid array, keeping step with an almost perfect line. They reached and descended a little gully or depression in the ground, and moving on ascended the opposite slope as if on brigade drill, while behind the stone wall the Union soldiers, with rifles cocked and fingers in the triggers, waited and bided their time, feeling confident thathey could throw back these regiments coming against them." When lverson's line was about 100 yards from Baxter's concealed fire, the Yankees rose up and delivered a mighty blast of musketry into the unsuspecting Confederate line. The historian of the 88th Pennsylvania observed that "at the command a sheet of flame and smoke burst forth from the wall with the simultaneous crash of the rifles, flaring full in the faces of the advancing troops, the ground being quickly covered . with their killed and wounded as the balls hissed and cut through their exposed line."E. Turner of the 23rd North Carolina wrote that "when we were in point blank range the dense line of the enemy rose from its protected lair and poured into us a withering fire from the front and both flanks."The Union fire particularly devastated the 5th and 20th North Carolina regiments, which were on lverson's left and therefore closer to the Union line. Baxter's two right regiments, the 90th Pennsylvania and 12th Massachusetts, were able to get a raking and cross fire on lverson's left that was "fatal all along the line."The surprised Confederate line suffered such heavy loses that its dead lay in a distinctly marked line of battle. Many of the slain Confederates did not even have the opportunity to fire a shot in their defense. Those who could still fight attempted to do so, but Lieutenant Oliver Williams of the 20th believed that "every man who stood up was either killed or wounded." These two regiments were already short on officers (the 5th entered action under the command of a Captain Speight B. West), and heavy officer losses restricted the units' ability to react. Lieutenant Williams of the 20th was wounded early in the fight, as were the regiment's senior officers, Lieutenant Colonel N. Slough and Major J.S. Brooks. In the 20th North Carolina, all four captains present were wounded, and three lieutenants were killed. At the right center of Iverson's line, the 23rd North Carolina was rocked by Baxter's fire but managed to stagger forward with heavy loss under deadly fire for about 20 yards to an irregular hollow at the center of Forney's field. Here the regiment was subject to continued "pitiless rifle fire" from the front, ''as well as from the more distant corner of the field in our front." The 20th, along with the survivors of the 5th and 12th who were still able to fight, "lay down in this hollow or depression in the field and fought as best it could" since it was "unable to advance, unwilling to retreat." The 23rd also suffered heavily in officers as well as men. Major C.C. Blacknall was shot through the mouth and neck in the initial Union volley. Miter reaching the hollow, Lieutenant Colonel R.D. Johnson was badly wounded, and Colonel DAHL. Christie was mortally stricken. Altogether, the regiment would lose all its commissioned field officers but one in the action. Iverson's right regiment, the 12th North Carolina, did not suffer as severely as the rest of the brigade because of the lay of the land and the fact that it was farthest (about 200 yards) from Baxter's line. One account states that Baxter's initial volley affected only the two left companies of the regiment. The regiment was able to hold its ground because most of it was protected by a slight rise of ground in its front. Even so, the regiment's two left companies continued to lose severely to enemy fire. The 12th North Carolina had more than Baxter's line to deal with. Cutler saw Iverson's attack coming and opened up along range fire on his left, which the Confederates apparently did not at first stop to answer. He then advanced his command out of the woods and proceeded by right oblique a short distance to a good position from which he could fire on Iverson's left. Lieutenant Colonel WAS. Davis of the 12th North Carolina found that the best way to deal with Cutler's advance and ensuing enfilade fire was to withdraw about 100 yards to the west to a little bottom in a Wheatfield. W. S. Davis' withdrawal left the rest of Iverson's brigade to even further devastation at Union hands. On the far left, the surviving elements of the 5th and 20th regiments had withdrawn, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded, and rallied in the same swale already occupied by the 23rd North Carolina. Here they "rallied and opened a sharp fire on the Union line." A few even attempted to renew their attack, only to be "again driven back to the ditch." Baxter's men replied to Iverson's fire and kept up a "steady, death dealing fire." Lieutenant George w: Grant of the 88th Pennsylvania recalled "our men loading in comparative safety, and then resting rifle on boulders before them, would fire coolly and with unerring aim." Sergeant Sam Boone of the same regiment saw that his men were all behaving splendidly and all his officers were present, so he left his post in the rear of the line and "picked up the musket of a wounded soldier, took cartridges from the cartridge boxes of the man and done some wicked firing into the mess of Confederate soldiers lying down in the field within short musket range." The Confederates in the gully, though, did manage to return an effective fire in the face of all this opposition. Private Jacob. Ménages of Company D, 11th. Pennsylvania, was shooting from a prone position and recalled that the enemy fire was fierce enough to "cut off the timothy heads above our own backs." In the 88th Pennsylvania, Sergeant Henry Evans of Company B was maintaining a steady fire along with Private John Wit Moyer of Company H. When he saw a Confederate color bearer defiantly flaunting his colors, Evans aimed his gun and said to his companion, "John, I will give these colors a whick." Just then Witmoyer heard the dull thud of a bullet, and turned quickly to ask if the Sergeant were hit. Evans gave no reply, but slowly brought his musket down, and fell over dead with a bullet wound in his heart. By now many of Iverson's men had had enough, and began waving hats and handkerchiefs in token of surrender. Some of the Union officers, though, feared a trap, and held an impromptu conference to consider what to do. Just then General Baxter rode up and gave the order, "up boys, and give them steel!" His decision to conduct a bayonet counterattack may have been influenced by the fact that some of his men were beginning to run out of ammunition. Privates Joseph Trainor and George Renair of Company D, 88th Pennsylvania, took up Baxter's order and jumped over the fence in their front in order to charge the Confederate line. They were followed at once by other members of their own unit and by men from the three regiments on their left, the 83rd New York, 97th New York and 11th Pennsylvania.

  The regimental historian of the 97th New York gives a different version of the beginning of this counterattack that emphasizes the role of his own regiment. He relates that the 97th's lieutenant colonel, John P. Spofford, was riding his horse near the left flank of the regiment when he saw the Confederates in the gully raise tokens of surrender. He says that Spofford, "taking in the situation at a glance and without waiting for orders, said 'Boys of the 97th, let us go over and capture them'." The regiment promptly sprang over the wall towards the gully, supported by the 11th Pennsylvania on its left and part of the regiment on its right; the entire regiment on the right "was shut out from this rapid movement by the aforementioned high rail fence, which from the wall, towards the west, intervened between it and the charging force." Colonel Wheelock of the 97th happened to be dismounted in the rear of the regiment when Spofford ordered the attack. He was "surprised at the action of this officer," but "took in the situation and went forward with his regiment without interfering with the order." Spofford later admitted, "1 knew I was liable to a dismissal from the service for giving the order to charge without the authority of Colonel Wheelock, and if the movement had met disaster I should have been; but to be successful I knew action must be taken before the Confederates recovered from their panic and the moment was critical; so I could not help it."Apparently a few men from the 12th Massachusetts, which was posted to the right of the 88th Pennsylvania, also participated in Baxter's counterattack. Adjutant C.C. Wehrum of the 12th noted that, "our fire must have taken terrible effect, for soon they laid down and a number of them tied handkerchiefs to their guns in token of surrender, it was a surprising spectacle to us for I could easily see they were in much stronger force than we were."As the Confederate attack began to break up, Wehrum heard "a great deal of hollering, some to cease firing, others to charge bayonets." Wehrum asked a comrade "what is the order," and was told "forward!" So he cried out, "forward, boys!" and charged forward with "a number of our regiment and a number of the regiment on our left" (88th Pennsylvania). They "ran right up to the rebel lines and several hundred of the rebs left their arms on the ground and rushed through our lines and they were directed to run out of range as quick as possible which they did without urging. Not all the members of the 12th, though, took part in the charge. The right end of the regiment's line may have been held back by fire from O'Neal's troops to the north.This fire also bothered the counterattacking troops of the 97th New York, who "suffered from a flank and near fire in the adjoining field on the right" that came from O'Neal's troops.

During this attack Colonel James L. Bates of the 12th Massachusetts was wounded in the neck. Adjutant Wehrum saw that his commander was bleeding badly, and tied his handkerchief around the colonel's neck. He feared that Bates might bleed to death and urged him to go to the rear. A lieutenant offered to escort the colonel, but he refused to go, stating that "we need every available officer at the post." Bates stayed with his men until he received a second wound within the hour, and had no choice but to retire.

General Baxter, who selflessly joined in the counterattack himself, was apparently unaware that some men of the 12th Massachusetts participated in the charge. However, he did acknowledge that the regiment aided in repulsing Iverson by making "a galling fire on the flank of this brigade, which I -think had a great influence on its surrender." Cutler's regiments to the left also succeeded at achieving an Enfield fire, on the right of the advancing Confederate line. The men of the 88th Pennsylvania, who led Baxter's counterattack, headed for the largest body of enemy troops in their front, the 23rd North Carolina. The Confederates surrendered in droves, and were at once hurried to the rear. First Sergeant Edward L. Gilligan of Company E secured the capture of the 23rd's flag, and for this deed was later awarded the Medal of Honor. He later related, "Captain Joseph H. Richard of my company singled out the color bearer of the 23rd. and had a hand-to-hand fight with him. The Confederate pluckily held on to the colors and only gave them up when I reasoned with him with the butt on my musket."At the same time Lieutenant Eldridge Levans of Company I, 88th Pennsylvania, captured a flag whose identity is not clear from the sources. After securing the colors, Levans presented it to General Robinson with "an impromptu speech." Lieutenant Grant of the 88th believed the flag had been lost by one of O'Neal's Alabama regiments that was serving with Iverson, but none of O'Neal's units are otherwise known to have done so. Captain Edmund Y. Patterson of the 88th thought it belonged to the 16th Alabama, but this unit was not at Gettysburg. Some sources suggest that Patterson may have meant O'Neal's 26th Alabama, even though this unit was serving on the. Eastern crest of Oak Ridge. A third Confederate flag was captured by the 97th New York. The 97th's attack was led by Company C, under the command of Lieutenant Ebenezer B. Harrison. Company C reached the Confederates in the "ditch" first, and Sergeant Sylvester Riley grabbed the flag of the 20th North Carolina. He at once handed it to Lieutenant Ebenezer Harrington, who in turn passed it on to Colonel Wheelock. Colonel Wheelock in his battle report noted that his command "brought out as prisoners 213 officers and men of the 20th North Carolina with their colors, ...more prisoners than we had men in our regiment."A fourth flag, that of the 5th North Carolina, was captured by Captain Erastus Clark of Company A, 12th Massachusetts. Clark for some reason never turned in his captured prize, but kept it with him until the end of his days. The flag was actually found on his body when he died in a strange knife duel in Louisiana in 1911.Yet another stand of colors was reportedly captured by some of Cutler's troops. As already noted, Cutler had advanced his brigade a short distance north of the woods where it had been posted to a fence line from where it was able to lay down an effective fire on the enemy "who lay behind a fence in a hollow." While here, the 76th New York shot down a set of colors, the third time that day they did so. When Baxter's troops made their charge, part of the 76th also attacked along with the 94th New York of Paul's brigade, which had just come up. Together they captured a large body of the enemy, along with a stand of colors. The identity of this flag has not been established. All accounts agree that Iverson's line was in total disarray when Baxter's attack struck. The historian of the 83rd New York observed that the Confederates were "huddled up in great confusion." Sergeant Boone of the 88th Pennsylvania remembered that the enemy troops "rose singly and in groups, holding their hands in a token of surrender. " Boone later felt badly that he had pushed one laggard prisoner to hurry faster to the rear: "One Confederate soldier came toward me in a stooping position, with his piece at trail arms. Thinking that he meant mischief, I struck him across the back with the side of my sword and ordered: 'Drop your arms; hasten to the rear.' The blow fell lightly on him but as he was passing me I noticed blood trickling from beneath his accoutrements. The poor fellow had evidently been wounded, but in his pain, misery and excitement had forgotten to drop his musket." While their comrades were busy gathering up prisoners by the score, a few plucky members of the 88th Pennsylvania pushed forward past the Confederate line 'and up the west slope of the gully which had been held by Iverson's men. Here they ran into a heavy fire on their front and both flanks from a variety of sources-O'Neal's skirmishers on the right, Ramseur's troops and the 3rd Alabama in their front, and the 12th North Carolina and Daniel's brigade on the left. This "galling fire"

made their position "too hot to hold," so they withdrew to the stone wall from where they had initiated the at tack.  John Vautier of the 88th Pennsylvania observed that "rifle balls were cutting the grass with a switching sound, taking effect among the Confederate prisoners as well as in our own ranks." The regiment then, "quickly realizing that their usefulness at this point was over, that pressing engagements called them to the stone wall, fell back without unnecessary delay, driving their willing captives before them. The farthest point of the 88th Pennsylvania's advance was later marked by a stone erected in Forney field about 80 yards west of the regiment's monument on the crest of the ridge. Isaac Hall of the 97th New York remembered that his unit was struck by fire from the north as it withdrew, and that several Confederate prisoners were wounded by this fire. A member of the 23rd North Carolina who survived the attack noted that the Federals left their wounded behind when they with drew but used bayonets and clubbed muskets to drive off their prisoners. They also "carried our flag with them." General Iverson did not at first understand the enormity of the disaster that was befalling his brigade. As already noted, he had sent to Daniel for a "large regiment" as support before the attack began. When he saw that his movement was in trouble, he sent his assistant adjutant general, Captain D. P. Halsey, to ask Daniel again for help. Halsey enroute met one of Daniel's staff officers and was told that a regiment had been sent, and none more could be spared. Much to Iverson's dismay, he discovered that the regiment that Daniel sent had formed on the right of O'Neal's 3rd Alabama, which was standing firm somewhere to the immediate west of the Forney farm buildings. Iverson then tried to organize a charge by the 3rd Alabama and 12th North Carolina in order to take advantage of "the confusion among the enemy incident to the charge and capture of my men." However, he was unable to mount the attack, "because in the noise and excitement I presume my voice could not be heard. "This is certainly no example of strong and decisive leadership on Iverson's part. The crux of the matter, however, was that Iverson's men were overwhelmed so quickly-in 15 to 30 minutes-that there was no time to bring up any assistance from any of the three brigades in immediate supporting distance. Iverson appears to have panicked when he saw white handkerchiefs being raised by his troops. At one point he reported to Rodes that his battle line was lying down in position, and that a whole regiment had gone over to the enemy. After the action, though, he realized that his troops had not lain down to escape combat, but had been felled where they stood by the initial Union volley; he found "that 500 of my men were left lying dead and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade."182 The disaster that befell Iverson's brigade was one of the most severe of the war, as costly as that suffered by Pickett's brigades two days later. Altogether the brigade lost over 65% of its strength, 71% if the less engaged 12th regiment is excluded. The 5th North Carolina on the left flank lost 289 of its 473 men (61 %), while the adjacent 20th North Carolina lost 253 of 372 (68%). The 23rd North Carolina, which was struck hardest by Baxter's charge lost a whopping 89% (282 of 316) . Casualties in the 12th regiment, which did not see heavy action from its position on the right of the line, were a much lighter 36% (79 of 219). Altogether the brigade's reported losses (which were clearly understated) amounted to 182 killed, 399 wounded, and 322 captured or missing. Some Union accounts claim that as many as 1000 of Iverson's men were captured, but this was not possible since the brigade had only about 1384 engaged. Confederate sources admit to from 250 to 300 captured; but the number was clearly higher than that. Lieutenant Walter Montgomery of the 12th North Carolina estimated that the brigade numbered only 350 or 400 men right after the battle. If this is true, the brigade must have lost closer to 900 men on the first day. Those who saw the field of Iverson's defeat after the fight were appalled at the sight. One poor Confederate was found with five bullets in his head, still clutching his musket. Everyone commented on how perfectly dressed the line of dead was. Henry Berkeley of the Confederate artillery observed 79 North Carolinians laying dead in a straight line within a few feet. Their line "was perfectly dressed. Three had fallen to the front, the rest had fallen backward; yet the feet of these dead were in a perfectly straight line." John Vautier of the 88th Pennsylvania wrote that, "Hundreds of the Confederates fell at the first volley, plainly marking their line with a ghastly row of dead and wounded men, whose blood trailed the course of their line with a crimson stain clearly discern able for several days after the battle, until the rain washed the gory record away." Lieutenant George Bullock of Company I, 23rd North Carolina, confirmed Gautier's grisly description: he said "that it was the only battle and he was in all in which his command was engaged from Williamsburg to Appomattox-where the blood ran like a branch. And that, too, on the hot, parched ground." Iverson's men were soon buried in trenches near where they fell. The brigade's pioneers dug four shallow pits "in the lowest part of the depression, in the rear of the battleground of Iverson's Brigade." The surface of the pits could easily be discerned by the more luxuriant growth of grass and crops over them. Even at the turn of the century, 30 years after the bodies of Iverson's dead had been disinterred and conveyed South, it was possible to find "flattened bullets which had evidently fallen from the disinterred skeletons," and other relics of war, in the Forney field. "Iverson's Pits" were held in dread for years. Mr. Forney, owner of the field, related that "after the battle there was a superstitious terror in regard to the field, and that it was with difficulty that laborers could be kept at work there on the approach of night on that account." Many of Iverson's troops justly blamed their commander for the " disaster that befell them at Gettysburg. Some believed that their commander "not only remained in the rear but that a big chestnut log intervened between him and the battle and that more than once he reminded his staff that for more than one at a time to look over was an unnecessary exposure of person." Private J. D. Hufham Jr. of the 20th North Carolina of Ramseur's brigade heard that "General Iverson's who was a drunk, I think, and a coward besides, was off hiding somewhere." Colonel Daniel H. Christie of the 23rd told some of his men as he lay dying from a mortal wound that he would make sure - that "The imbecile Iverson" should never lead them into battle again. Colonel Thomas F. Toon of the 20th North Carolina wrote in his postwar sketch that the regiment was "sacrificed at Gettysburg," and the historian of the 23rd North Carolina wrote plaintively: "Unwarned, unled as a brigade, went forward Iverson's deserted band to its doom. Deep and long must the desolate homes and orphan children of North Carolina rue the rashness of that hour." Iverson certainly deserved the criticism heaped upon him. Despite the promise he had shown at Gaines' Mill and the experience gained at South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville,  Iverson appears to have done nothing right at Gettysburg. He did not properly coordinate his attack with O'Neal (who was not having a good day himself), did not reconnoiter the ground over which he was to attack, and let his men go forward without a covering force of skirmishers. He also was not clear about the axis of his attack, and failed to bring up reinforcements that were readily available. Most significantly, he, like Pickett, did not advance with his men. Thus it is no wonder some of his officers and men refused to serve under him after the battle. He reportedly "went to pieces and became unfit for further command" during the rest of the battle, though he did a reasonable job during the retreat to Virginia. Lee declined to have him serve longer in his army, and Iverson was shipped off to command Georgia state troops at Rome, Georgia. He was given a chance to redeem himself in early 1864 when he was given command of a brigade of cavalry in Joe Johnston's army, and won acclaim for capturing Union cavalry General George Stoneman near Macon in July. Iverson managed orange groves in Florida after the war, and died in Atlanta in 1911 at the age of 63.197 As already noted, the 12th North Carolina on Iverson's right managed to survive the attack relatively intact because of the lay of the ground and the fact that it was farther from Baxter's line than was the rest of the brigade. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel WS. Davis, withdrew to a swale some 200 yards southwest of the Forney farm buildings, and managed to fight off the enemy by refusing both his wings. After the rest of the brigade was repulsed, Davis noted, "On my left there was a gap made as far as I would see. On the right there was a considerable gap between us and Daniel's brigade. I was left alone without any orders (our general in the rear, and never coming up), with no communication on right or left, and with only one hundred and seventy five men confronting several thousand." He felt fortunate that the Union troops in the woods to his right front did not counterattack; all he saw was an occasional vendetta run out to the margin and run back. Eventually Davis' position was reinforced by the remnants of the brigade's other regiments, which had been rallied by Captain D. P. Halsey.

 

Info. From:

Book Gettysburg July1 By David G. Martin

 
 

 

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

July 1-3, 1863

 

Subordination:  2d Brigade/Baxter; 11th PVI, 88th PVI, 90th PVI, 83rd NY*,

                        97th NY, 12th  MA. 2d Division/Robinson, I Corps/Reynolds. 

                        88th PVI, Major Foust commanding.

                        *83rd NY is also known as the "9th Militia". 

July 1, 1863 – Movement to Gettysburg.  At approximately 9 a.m. Robinson's Division, being last in the I Corps line of march, breaks camp at Emmetsburg and by 11 o'clock, they advance to the sound of cannonading at Gettysburg. Baxter's Brigade, in the company of the Second Division marches northward on the Emmetsburg Road toward Gettysburg.  Entering the town from the south, the troops continue to march north on Washington Street.  At the corner of Washington and Chambersburg Streets, they turn left and proceed west on Chambersburg Pike.  Robinson uses the topographic cover afforded by the Lutheran Seminary to consolidate his troops and then orders them onward into their respective positions along the union line of battle. The troops of Robinson's Division "quick" and "double-quick" the last two miles.  They arrive on the field between 11:30 and 12:00 a.m.  The 11th Pennsylvania and 97th New York lead the brigade, and are placed to the right of Culter's Brigade (Second Brigade, First Division, I Corps). Immediately thereafter, when the 11th PV and 97th NY become engaged, the remainder of Baxter's Brigade crosses Cashtown Pike.  Moving north on the reverse slope of the ridge, they cross over the unfinished railroad cut and move toward Oak Hill. The brigade advances in order; 12th Massachusetts, 90th Pennsylvania, 83rd New York, and lastly, the 88th Pennsylvania.  Baxter’s brigade takes position on the far right flank of I Corps, and to the right/north of Cutler's Brigade.  Baxter anchors the center of his line on Mummasburg Road, and then with two regiments, refuses his right flank.  This places the 83rd New York and the 88th Pennsylvania on the far right facing north.

July 1st, we left camp near Marsh Creek, some 5-6 miles south of Gettysburg, and upon approaching the latter place, heard the distant booming of the cannon, and a little later, the rattle of the small arms.  We could see the little white puffs of smoke from exploding shells from the Rebel guns over the tree tops in the neighborhood of the Seminary.  In all the battles of the Regt up to this date, nothing more serious befell me than having my clothes pierced with Rebel bullets.  Having a presentiment that something was about to happen to me, I ran back to the Hospital Orderly, who did not go into battle, and handed him my pocket book with instructions to forward it to my people should anything befall me.  That comrade faithfully carried out my instructions.          First Lieutenant Boone, Company B, 88th Pennsylvania 1.

           Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, commanding the Confederate Second Corps, identifies the gap in the Union line, and orders Rode’s Division to move against the far right flank of I Corps and the far left of the XI Corps.  Seeking to split the Union Corps boundary, Rodes moves his division southeast toward the Union right flank, his brigades deployed from right/west to left/east in turn, Iverson, O'Neals' and Dole's. Daniel's and Ramseur's Brigades were held as the division reserve. The actual jump-off time, distance to the Union left, the line of March, terrain, and rate of march are all factors which impact the time at which the respective Confederate brigades of Rodes’ Division actually became engaged. The exact chronological sequence remains ambiguous, but it is probable that O'Neal’s left, composed of the 5th and 6th Alabama were the first to come in contact with Baxter's line at approximately 2 p.m.  Lieutenant General Ewell, states in his after action report 2. That O'Neal’s brigade "advanced in some disorder, in a different direction than that indicated by Major General Rodes, and with only three regiments." (The 12th, 26th,  and 6th Alabama)  The 5th Alabama was also then sent to their support, moving on the far left of the Confederate line.  Baxter states in his after action report, that “indications being we should be attacked on the right flank, changed front by the right." 3. This would have faced the brigade northward, fronting Mummasburg Road and placed them in position to repel the assault by O'Neal’s Brigade.  Baxter’s skirmishers then cross the Mummasburg Road and move northward towards the McLean Barn. Here they are engaged in moderately heavy firing against advancing Confederate skirmishers from O’Neal’s Brigade. As the full regiments of O’Neal’s Alabama Brigade come forward, the 45th New York (XI Corps) moves forward to protect Baxter’s exposed right flank. The combined fire, and accurate artillery support are sufficient to break up O’Neal’s attack, and the Confederates retreat back behind the McLean farm. Having successfully repelled O'Neal's Brigade, Baxter consolidates his forces on the southern side of Mummasburg Road and changes front to meet the impending threat advancing on his left (or westward facing) flank.  By filing back to the left, Baxter places the 83rd New York and 88th Pennsylvania in the center of the brigade front, and leaves the 90th Pennsylvania to hold the brigade's right flank along Mummasburg Road.  Paul's Brigade moves forward to man those positions vacated by Baxter's Brigade.  That Baxter had sufficient time to meet multiple threats on both his flanks indicates that the brigades of Rode's Division attacked in a staggered position and attests to the well drilled discipline of the soldiers of Baxter’s Brigade.

We left the Emmettsburg Road south of the historic Codori Farm and passed along the eastern side of Seminary ridge at the double quick.  We were halted along the ridge long enough for the men to load their pieces, and then continued our advance until we reached Mummasburg Road, where our further progress was disputed by the enemy.  We formed along the road facing north east, and repulsed a body of Rebels which were bearing down on us from the north.  But, about this time, a force threatened us from the west, and we were obliged to come to an about face and right half wheel, which brought us to the top of the Ridge and behind a low wall or stone fence.  As soon as the enemy was within range, the whole brigade delivered a withering volley into them, compelling them to take shelter in a depression, or gulley in the field.  Here we held them for hours, as there was a gentle rise in the field to their rear which prevented them from retreating.        

First Lieutenant S. Boone, Company B, 88th Pennsylvania 4.

The brigade takes cover behind stone wall and is deployed from left to right; 11th Pennsylvania, 97th New York, 83th New York, 88th Pennsylvania, 12th Massachusetts, and on the far right, where Baxter refused the flank, the 90th Pennsylvania is bent back 90 degrees along the Mummansburg Road. There exists a 400-yard gap between the right flank of I Corps, and the left flank of XI Corps.

Source:  Bruce Schulze, Civil War Album Private J. Coghill, Company G, 23rd North Carolina

 At  2:30 p.m. Baxter's Brigade, arise up from their concealed positions behind the stone wall and at a distance of less than 90 yards, fires a full volley into Iverson's advancing brigade, in the process, killing 130 and wounding 328.  So severe were the effects of Baxter's volley, that bone fragments, and debris passing through from the first rank struck Confederate soldiers in the second rank. Eyewitness reports state the front rank was marked by 79 dead, who with the exception of three, were all blown backwards and lay side by side.  One Confederate soldier reportedly was found with five bullet wounds to his head.  “….  wee took the Baltimore road and marched to Gettysburg and when wee got there  wee formed a line of battle and soon the battle opened and our brigade made the attack    wee charged on the yanks through an open field and the yanks behind a rock fence and it was the hardest fighting I  ever saw   our only officer was killed Lieu Champion was killed   and now I regret to tell you that Rial Stewart was killed after he was taken prisoner   the yanks took the best part of our regt and brigade and while they was caring them on to the rear we had another line of battle marched up and shot a volley into the yanks and the prisoners and a ball hit Rial in the side  the ball went in one side and came out the other   he lived some four or five hours after he was struck   he was in his right mind until he died   some of our boys stayed with him until he died   I never saw him no more after he went into the fight   Brother buried him   he was killed in the battle of Gettysburg Adams Co. Pa.  I loved Rial as a brother and I would do envy thing that I could for him   he was a brave and noble young man but alas he as fallen in the cause of his beloved country   our loss was awful….”   

Private J. Coghill, Company G, 23rd North Carolina

A heavy fire from Baxter’s and Cutler’s Brigades forces the Confederates to ‘go to ground’, and they seek the inadequate shelter in a shallow depression in front of Baxter’s position. For many of the North Carolinians, this depression will also become their mass grave, and will in later times come to be known as “Iverson’s Pit”.  The 88th Pennsylvania, 83rd, and 97th New York then follow up the devastating volley with a bayonet charge.  The 88th captures two Confederate regimental flags. The 97th New York also captures one stand on colors (probably that of the 20th North Carolina), only to have those same colors later recaptured by Confederate forces. Captain A. H. Gallaway, of the 45th North Carolina, will be credited with recapturing the colors of the 20th North Carolina. 
We commissioned officers of Company B were all present, and the men were behaving so splendidly, that I left the duty of keeping them in line to the two other officers, and picked up a musket of a wounded soldier, took cartridges from the cartridge boxes of the men, and done some wicked firing into the mass of confederate soldiers lying on the ground within short musket range.  Finally I noticed white flags affixed to their bayonets, and the whole Brigade charged done through the field.  As we approached their line, they arose in groups, held their hands up, and came running towards us. One confederate soldier came forward toward me in a stooping position still carrying his musket at trail arms.  Thinking he meant mischief, I ordered "drop your arms and get back quick", at the same time slashed him across the back with the flat, or side of my sword blade.I noticed blood trickling from underneath his accoutrements; although I did not hurt the man, I have regretted this act many times since.  He had been shot, and in his pain, forgot to drop his arms.We took nearly all the regiment in our immediate front, which was the 23rd N.C. regiment, as prisoners, but while we were mixed up with the Rebels out on the field, another body of confederates poured a destructive, enfilading fire into us from the Mummasburg Road on our right, and killed and wounded perhaps as many of their own men as of ours. 

First Lieutenant S. Boone, Co B, 88th PVI 6.
Though written from opposing sides of the stone wall, Boone’s and Coghill’s accounts are remarkably consistent.  Coghill escapes only because he was assigned as a regimental sharpshooter and was not deployed with the main body of the 23rd North Carolina.  In addition to the loss of their regimental colors, the 23rd North Carolina suffers a horrific total of forty-five men killed outright, nineteen mortally wounded, forty-two wounded, and 177 captured (of whom eighty were also wounded.  Busey and Martin estimate the 23rd NC entered the battle with 336 troops and officers.  Of those, they lost 283.  This regimental loss of 84.2% dwarfs even Iverson’s aggregate brigade loss of 65.2%.
We got the order to charge the retreating enemy and we struck the Twenty-third North Carolina and captured nearly the entire regiment.  Captain Joseph H. Richard, of my company singled out the color bearer of the Twenty-third and had a hand-to-hand fight with him.  The Confederate pluckily held on to the colors and only gave them up when I reasoned with him with the butt of my musket”      
First Sergeant  Edward Gilligan, Company E, 88th Pennsylvania  As Baxter’s troops round up the Confederate prisoners, they are fired on by another advancing line of Confederates.  The Confederate fire is indiscriminate and hits Union and Confederate soldiers alike. Private George Toland, of Company C, is wounded when a minie ball enters his eye and exits through his mouth.  Toland, who had also been wounded during the Battle of Fredericksburg, survives his wounds and is transferred to the Veteran Reserve Corps on November 15, 1863. That the 88th Pennsylvania captured two regimental stands of colors, one of them being the 23rd North Carolina, is well documented. The identity of the second stand remains more ambiguous.  Captain Edmund Patterson, of Company K and serving as acting commander of the 88th at Gettysburg, states in his after action report 8. Dated August 22, 1863, that the 88th captured the colors of the 23rd North Carolina and the 16th Alabama. Bates, in The History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers also states the flags as being the 23rd North Carolina and 16th Alabama.   Brigadier General Henry Baxter, commanding the Second Brigade, simply refers to "the taking of two battle flags" by the 88th Pennsylvania, and another by the 97th New York”. In fact, the 16th Alabama was not engaged at Gettysburg, nor was even in the Northern Virginia area of Operations.  The 16th Alabama was actually engaged in operations in Kentucky and Tennessee, which draws into question the actual identity of the second captured flag. Rode's Division was purely subordinated by state, with the brigades of Ramseur, Iverson and Daniels composed of regiments from North Carolina, and Dole's Brigade composed solely of regiments from Georgia.  If indeed, as Captain Patterson maintains that the second flag was that of an Alabama regiment, then the most likely candidates would have been among those regiments of O'Neal's Brigade.  This would also indicate that elements of O'Neals Brigade were still on the field when Iverson attacked, and that the Alabama troops were located on the western side of Oak Ridge.   This brigade, originally commanded by Colonel Rodes, was composed of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 12th, and 26th Alabama regiments, and was the only unit of Alabama troops on that section of the field, at that time, and engaged against Baxter's brigade.  Of these regiments, the 3rd and 5th were not directly engaged against Baxter, and only the 6th, 12th, and 26th advanced together on that sanguinary day.  By numerical analysis, all three could be equally mistaken for a "16th” as Patterson reports.  None of the Officers commanding any of these three regiments mention losing their regimental colors, but then, the loss of a unit's color is not something a commander would want to officially dwell on. Historian Paul Cooksey notes that Alabama Archives published a book detailing the history of Alabama regimental flags in which is stated that the flag of the 26th Alabama was captured at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863.  It is probable that it was in fact the 26th Alabama that was captured by the 88th Pennsylvania and was subsequently erroneously recorded in as the 16th Alabama.  Lieutenant Boone states that members of the 88th tore up and divided the fabric of the

23rd North Carolina's flag to preclude its recapture.  It is probable the same fate befell the colors of the Alabama regiment thereby rendering its future identification impossible.  (Some portion of the North Carolina flag, however, must have remained intact however, as it is listed as being returned to the State of North Carolina on March 25, 1905.) General Robinson reports Iverson's Brigade suffered five hundred killed and wounded, 1000 captured, and three regimental standards captured by Baxter's Brigade. 10.  Iverson later confirms the loss of five hundred killed or wounded, but (unrealistically) places the number of Confederate soldiers captured at 308.  Though remaining on the field, Iverson's Brigade is rendered combat ineffective for remainder of the battle, and he would later be removed from command.  Brigadier General Rode’s later reports that "Iverson's dead lay in a distinctly marked line of battle".  Based on Rode's Casualty Reports, Dole's Brigade suffered 17% attrition, Ramseur's 18%, O'Neal's 39%, Daniels' 40%, and Iverson's 55%. Busey and Martin, in their book "Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg" place Iverson's losses at 65.2%, with 322 captured.  This is the highest attrition rate of any Confederate Brigade engaged at Gettysburg. Facing pressure from Ramseur's Brigade, and almost surrounded by Dole's Brigade, Baxter is reinforced and then relieved by Paul's Brigade.  At 3:45 p.m., Major General James Wadsworth, gives the order to begin retiring to Cemetery Hill.

 Here the retreat commenced, as the enemy was receiving reinforcements from all directions, and those who were lying on the ground, and who were uninjured, took up arms against us.   We were relieved by Pauls Brigade and fell back between the ridge and the town.  Here a halt was made with the colors around which we hoped to rally a goodly number, but being nearly out of ammunition, the Regt. was practically out of service.  Here also, we destroyed a Rebel battle flag which we had captured from the 23rd N.C. Regt.  Capt Richards of Co. E, cleaving the flag from the staff with his sword, my portion of the trophy being the brass cross-piece below the lance, or spear at the top of the staff.  A large number of us Officers returned to the ridge to render such assistance as we could to Stewarts Battery, but on our arrival at the railroad cut, it had been so closely pressed that it was now in full retreat.  In fact, the whole army, in every direction was in full retreat.                                   First Lieutenant S. Boone, Co B, 88th PVI  11.

At approximately 4 p.m., with their ammunition all but depleted, the 88th Pennsylvania and the remainder of the Second Brigade fight a retrograde movement with remnants of I Corps, back through town of Gettysburg; most elements retreating along the Railroad cut toward town, and then south on Baltimore Street. Stewart's Battery (Company B, 4th US Artillery), becomes one of the rally points for the retreating troops and a number of the soldiers of the 88th are captured while supporting in the artillery battery’s gallant efforts cover the Union withdraw.  Union soldiers from numerous regiments converge into one blue mass moving through the town of Gettysburg.  Shots with advancing Confederates are exchanged on the fly, and organization ceases above the squad level.

My course was along the graded embankment of the old Stephens Railroad, north side, and I came near running into the right flank of a Rebel skirmish line.  I ran up, and crossed the embankment, and strange to say, I was not fired at, nor even challenged although I was only about 60 paces from the nearest skirmisher.  The 11th Corps had been swept from our right, but I continued on my course into the town.  I was delayed a few moments by the confederates firing from the Diamond at our soldiers crossing Chambersburg St.  A comrade ahead of me drew their fire, and thinking it my chance before they could load their pieces, I also crossed in safety. I continued my retreat along alleys and bystreets until I reached the southern suburbs, where after crossing one fence of a lane, I fell into the lane, too exhausted to cross the other fence.  After a short breathing spell, I noticed that the lane ended up against a board fence, one of these upright boards having been removed.  Here I was on high ground and could see eastward about a half square between houses to Baltimore St. (The principal street running North and South), and could see no movement or life on this street of any kind, and concluded the coast was clear in this direction. Gathering myself up, I ran down the lane, crept through the opening in the board fence, ran down through the garden of a house fronting on Baltimore St, and passed down along house to the pole, or picket fence running along Baltimore Street.  An ominous silence seemed to pervade this locality.  Upon opening the gate to step out on Baltimore street, I looked left to see if there was any danger in that direction, and lo and behold, when I stuck my head beyond the corner of the house, I stood face to face with one of the most desperate soldiers in the Rebel Army – a "Louisiana Tiger". He was so close to me that he was obliged to jump away from me in order to level his piece at me.  For an instant, we both stood transfixed, neither of us knowing if we were the victor or the vanquished.  It took but a minute for him to decide, as I had my sword sheathed, and was unprepared to meet him. With his finger on the trigger and with the black muzzle us his gun pointed at my breast, ready to send me into eternity in an instant, he very excitedly ordered "Surrender".  I was at his mercy.  Throwing my right hand up I also excitedly said "You've got the best of me" I stepped toward him to show him I was not going to resist, when he ordered "Give me that sword".  Coming to a left face to go up Baltimore St. I raised my hands to my belt buckle to unbuckle it, when he again jumped away from me.  He brought his piece to bear on me and demanded "have you got any pistols about?"  This, I think was the most critical moment of my life; he thought I was reaching to my belt for a pistol.  I again faced him to show him what I was doing, and threw the sword, belt and all on the pavement against the house saying "if you want it, you must pick it up for yourself."  That was the last I ever saw of the sword and belting.  As he was no officer, I did not feel like handing him my sword.

First Lieutenant S. Boone, Co B, 88th PVI 

 

An officer serving in a sister regiment in Baxter’s Brigade relates this account (as excerpted) detailing the fighting withdraw from Oak Ridge.

We fought from 1 P.M. until 5 P.M, when the order was given to fall back to the Railroad. (We had fallen back and rallied four times by then.) We found that they had turned on our left also and our only escape was to follow the railroad into town.  Our regiment was the last to leave and the last to get into town…The Rebels were 20 rods nearer to the town than us… The bullets were flying from each side in a perfect shower.  The air seemed so filled that it seemed almost impossible to breathe without inhaling them. Some one fell beside me almost every step.        

Lieutenant W. B. Judd, 97th New York 13.

    An officer serving in a sister regiment in Baxter’s Brigade relates this account (as excerpted) detailing the fighting withdraw from Oak Ridge As the troops exit town on Baltimore Street, they reform on Cemetery Hill.  Ammunition is issued and the division moves southwest on Cemetery Ridge. As General Doubleday takes stock of and reorganizes the battered I Corps, he relays orders for his old division and Robinson’s Division to be posted along the southern side of Cemetery Ridge, paralleling Emmettsburg Road, and Wadworth’s Division to be posted on the far right on Culp’s Hill.  In a placement that further exacerbates command and control issues, Howard’s XI Corps is posted on the north side of Cemetery Hill and physically separates Wadsworth’s Division from the other I Corps divisions.  Given the day’s performance, the soldiers of the I Corps are probably less than thrilled to have the XI Corps break the continuity of their line. At 5 p.m., Colonel Coulter of the 11th Pennsylvania is ordered to assume command of Paul’s First Brigade. (Paul was wounded and blinded on Oak Hill.) Accordingly, the 11th is also assigned to the First Brigade, Second Division.  Baxter's Brigade then moves to the left and forward, forming a line of battle close and parallel to the Emmettsburg Road.  Here the troops begin constructing breastworks. They spend the night in line of battle and under arms near Zeigler's Grove.  Between 6 –10 a.m. the following morning they are relieved by Webb's Brigade of the II Corps.  Baxter’s Brigade moves a short distance to the rear and awaits orders.  During the next two days, Baxter’s troops will be used as a rapid mobile reserve force. In the custom of the period, capturing an enemy battle flag was often criteria for the awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and for his actions on July 1st, Sergeant Edward Gilligan, Company E, 88th Pennsylvania, will be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1892.  Lieutenant Levan of Company I, who is credited in the 88th’s regimental history 14. As having had captured the Alabama battle flag is not recognized, and like the identity of the flag itself, his deeds are consigned to an ambiguity of history.  Major Foust, wounded and incapacitated, is later transferred to the Veterans Reserve.  He will later be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, but will not again command the 88th in the field.  Foust will be brevetted to Brigadier General in March of 1865 for gallant and meritorious service in numerous engagements.  He will die in 1870 at age thirty. July 2, 1863- Webb's Brigade (Second Brigade, Gibbon's Division, II Corps) arrives to relieve Baxter's Brigade between 6:30 to 7:00 a.m.  Moving into the section of line vacated by Baxter, Webb anchors his right flank on Cushing's Battery (Company A, 4th U.S. Artillery) and his left flank on Battery B of the 1st Rhode Island Artillery.  Baxter withdraws his brigade and moves to the southern area of Cemetery Hill between the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road.  Here, Baxter's troops briefly rest near the farm of Catherine Guinn. (The Guinn Farm is located just south of the National Cemetery on the eastern side of the Taneytown Road, about 200 yards south of the present National Park Service Visitor Center.) The reprieve will however be short, as Robinson's Division, and in particular Baxter's Brigade, will be used as a rapid reaction reserve throughout the remainder of the day.  During the early morning hours, soldiers of the I Corps are indignant to learn that General Meade had replaced acting Corps Commander Abner Doubleday with Major General John Newton of the VI Corps.  Following the death of General Reynolds on July 1st, Doubleday had assumed command of the I Corps, and had not only maintained Corps cohesion but had fought a stubborn delaying action which slowed the Confederate advance and inflicted heavy Confederate casualties.  Meade’s change of command, based in large part on faulty information provided by General O. O. Howard, is seen as a lack of confidence in Doubleday, and in a larger sense seems to mitigate I Corps solid performance on July 1st. By mid morning, the II Corps had arrived in sufficient numbers to relieve the majority of Robinson’s and Doubleday’s exhausted divisions from the frontline along Cemetery Ridge.  The Second Division then redeploys to Cemetery Hill near the intersection of Baltimore Pike and Emmettsburg Road in order to shore up the defenses of XI Corps.  At 4 p.m., Confederate artillery batteries of Ewell’s Corps begin to bombardment on the northern most section of the Union line held by XI Corps.  In response, Baxter’s Brigade is sent to reinforce the XI Corps line and to support Union artillery posted on the northern face of Cemetery Hill.  Baxter’s troops remain here, under Confederate artillery and sharpshooter fire until early evening, when a Confederate assault by Anderson’s Division is launched against the lines of the III Corps. At 6 p.m., Doubleday's Division and the remnants of Robinson's move to assist Willard's Brigade and, according to General Hancock, "established themselves on the line, meeting the enemy at once, and doing good execution." 15. as they are arriving on the field, the 1st Minnesota launches its valiant attack.   The sacrifice of the 1st Minnesota is what is known as a “delaying action” in modern terms, and it is ultimately successful in buying time to bolster the Union line.  The Second Division moves further to the west along Cemetery Ridge and is posted between, and to the rear of, Willard’s Third Brigade (II Corps/ 3rd Division) and Brigadier General Humphreys’ Second Division (III Corps). The 88th Pennsylvania and 12th Massachusetts move to fill the position from which the 1st Minnesota had earlier launched their charge against Wilcox’s Alabama Brigade.  The 88th deploys forward as skirmishers, however Baxter's Brigade is not actively engaged for the remainder of the day.  Once the line is secured, they remain here until dark. Today, a stone marker denoting the position of the 88th on July 2d, sits adjacent the monument to the gallant 1st Minnesota Infantry.

Dear Mother

Charley Ely and myself are here, getting along fine.  Ely is wounded pretty badly, but I think he will get along all right.  He was struck in the right breast, the ball passing through him.  My wounds are slight compared with other men in our company.  Chas North got struck slightly but is not on the wounded listed.  Capt. Joseph Perham, of our company, died this morning. He had not been sensible for twelve hours previous.  He was shot in the face, on the right side of the nose, and the ball came out the left side of the head, back of the ear, making a hole that you could put an egg into.  I rather think we have given the Ribs the worst of it this time.  But if ever I saw such a leather and wooden country as Southern Pennsylvania, I hope to be shot again. There is no patriotism; everybody is stingy mean.  Our men sent out to get some old sheets for bandages, and the natives said “they had none to give away, but would sell some.” (They are wealthy people too.)  The Pennsylvania Volunteers are loud in their curses against Southern Pennsylvania—worse than any of the New York and western troops.  You can’t see a citizen any where, only around gratifying their curiosity.  Now in Maryland the citizens just swarmed after the battle of Anita took care of the wounded – and did everything they could.”

                             Charles Goddard, Company K, 1st Minnesota 16.

 

Given the proximity of the 1st Minnesota and Baxter’s Brigade, it is entirely possible some of those overheard curses about the good citizens of Southern Pennsylvania emanated from the 11th, 88th, or 90th Pennsylvania Volunteers. Similar sentiments about the citizens of Gettysburg can be found in Captain D.D. Jones’ letter dated November 22, 1863. Private John Wooten of the 88th Pennsylvania, Company a, reports 17. That while moving out on picket duty, he gave water from his canteen to a wounded Confederate officer who identifies himself as General Barksdale of Mississippi. General William Barksdale had led his brigade of Mississippi troops in a nearly successful assault on the Federal line. He fell mortally wounded while leading that charge between the hours of six and seven that evening. Barksdale would be recovered and taken to a Federal field hospital where he would succumb to his wounds Well into the evening, Baxter’s Brigade is again moved back to the same section of XI Corps lines that they had earlier supported.  Here they remain until 3 a.m. on the July 3rd. July 3, 1863- at daybreak, Ewell renews his attack on the Union right, and Confederates of Johnson’s Division assault Slocum’s XII Corps.  In response, at 9 a.m., Baxter’s Brigade is moved further to the right to support the XII Corps.  Here they are subjected to heavy Confederate artillery fire. They remain in position on the XII Corps line until 1 p.m., when orders arrive to move the Brigade to support the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. The timing of the movement coincides with the opening of Lee’s 140 gun predatory barrages on Union positions.  Baxter’s Brigade redeploys northward and into the center of the Union line, here they are put in reserve.  At 2 p.m., the 88th Pennsylvania is located at the foot of Cemetery Hill.  (Today, a second stone marker located near the visitor center denotes this position.) As Confederate artillery overshoots the Union front lines, the Second Brigade finds itself in under direct fire from the Confederate artillery barrage.  As Southern case shot bursts about them, Baxter relocates his troops to small depression to avoid the Confederate direct line of fire.  At 6 p.m., the Second Brigade is ordered forward to reinforce a section of Union frontline under assault during "Pickett’s charge”. Here, they are positioned to the right of the Philadelphia Brigade, Hayes’ Division/ II Corps.  While they are credited with assisting in the repulse of the Confederate assault, it is possible however; that as they deployed to this position at 6 p.m., the main brunt of the Confederate charge had already been broken. The 12th Massachusetts, 90th Pennsylvania and part of the 88th Pennsylvania are detailed for skirmish line duty for remainder of the night. The skirmishers push westward out to Emmettsburg Road amid the human wreckage left behind after the Confederate assault.  Baxter, in his after action report, 18. States the Second Brigade began the Battle of Gettysburg with just under 1200 troops, and suffered a total of 645 killed, wounded, or missing.  The 88th enters the battle with 296 men. Total losses sustained by the 88th Pennsylvania for the three days of battle at Gettysburg are twelve killed or mortally wounded, fifty-four wounded, and forty-two missing.  This equates to a 36% loss. Among the known soldiers of the 88th who were killed or mortally wounded at Gettysburg:

 Company A:  Private William Beaumont

Company B:  Sergeant Henry Evans

Company C,  Privates  Charles Zazier, Michael Hollacher

Company E:  Privates  Jacob Andrews, Joseph Bruner

Company H:  Private  Robert Simons

Company I:   Privates  David Harland, John Link, Edward Sturges (MW),  

                   John Lynch

Company K:  Private  John Corn (MW)

July 1st is a hard day for the Beaumont family, whose three sons all serve In Company A, of the 88th Pennsylvania.  In addition to William being killed, Sergeant George Beaumont is wounded, and Private John Beaumont is wounded and captured.  Before the war ends, tragedy will again befall the Beaumont family. William Beaumont will later be reentered along with Harry Evans at the Gettysburg National Cemetery.

 

 

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